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"Purify Yourselves!" Piye's Victory Stele as Theological Statement

In the Cairo museum sits a large stele (JDE 48862 + 47086 – 47089), measuring 1.8 by 1.84 meters, discovered by Said Pasha in 1862, which is possibly one of the most intriguing pieces of Egyptian monumental literature to have been discovered. Carved onto a round-topped granite block, the text describes the military campaign of Piye into Egypt in order to quell Tefnakht, a northern ruler from Sais. This stele is not the first document of Piye's forays into Egypt; the "Sandstone Stele" dating from regnal year 3 recounts a similar exercise. What makes his triumphal victory stele important, however, is the state of preservation, and the fact that there are very few monuments from this period of Egyptian history of such depth and literary scope.

Scholars have largely been in agreement for a long time over the combination of both historical narrative and literary work found within the text, and so drawing out definite conclusions with certainty has been difficult. Gardiner (1935) noted that the text, being upon a triumphal stele, should be viewed with a discerning eye, expectant of both historical and ideological narrative. However, we must remember that while we tend to separate these two, as well as religious and non-religious, the ancient Egyptians did not (Muhlestein, 2007), and so we must attempt to examine the stele in light of this interconnection between "mundane and ultra-mundane", in order to allow any conclusions drawn to be within the Egyptian cultural context of this mixing of styles. Taking these factors into account will allow us to investigate the stele in a more useful manner and will inform our conclusions. This paper hopes to show that a large part of the evidence points to a king who truly believed himself to be a holy man doing the will of Amun by cleansing Egypt of its wickedness, not simply as religious justification for his political actions, but in order to return it to the "true" worship of Amun.

Upon reading the text, the first striking point is that while the stele gives a narration of events, it focuses not so much on the events themselves but the methods used, such as ritual cleansing, and mercy to those who had not "blasphemed God". An unusual amount of emphasis is placed on Piye's religious instruction to his army, such as to "Purify yourselves in the water!" While there is undoubtedly an element of propaganda here, in displaying his army as clean and pure in the fight against his opponents, it is also unusual in that, bar the opening speech (which still focuses on Amun while exclaiming his kingship), the boasts about the king's individual power are conspicuous by their absence - particularly surprising on a victory stele set up in the capital. Instead, the glory is given to Amun, with special note being given to Piye's religious conduct, such as his celebrating the Opet feast. If the campaign had been a purely political move justified by a religious motivation, then the usual declarations of the power of the ruler would be expected. This is replaced by a diversion of the reader's attention away from the kings own power towards that of Amun. He was certainly an important deity for the Kushites, and perhaps the arrival of Amun priests in Nubia, fleeing from Thebes, started the process of religious fervency for his cult within Kush, and also began an "Egyptianising" process there (Kendall, 1999), allowing the Kushites to later see themselves as the rightful heirs to Egypt. However, Kendall's assertion that "The Kushite state was a deliberate creation of the Amun priesthood of Thebes" appears to be merely unsupported speculation that simplifies a gradual change with multifaceted factors. Although by far the most famous example, Piye certainly was not the first to attempt to "Amunize" a territory. Years before him, the mysterious Queen Katimala had written an inscription at Semna, in which she viewed the war that she had fought "as a struggle between the faithful servants of Amun against enemies of the deities" (Darnell 2006, p.63). He then makes an interesting point:

for Katimala only the most fervent devotion to Amun could bring victory. In the

face of this intense personal reliance on faith in Amun, Piye's concern that his

troops be ritually pure before entering the precinct of Karnak becomes *something*

more than good manners and political sagacity. (Emphasis mine)

From this we can note that Piye's seemingly unrealistic dedication is not an isolated case, but a recurring trend among Kushite elite. Darnell is not the only scholar to have noted his predecessors' fervency: Ritner (2009, p.456) particularly also notices the seeming zealousness of Katimala. However, Török (2008, pp.297-298) disagrees with Darnell's assertions within his paper as purely hypothetical, questioning the validity of the conclusions that Darnell draws. Unfortunately Török appears to miss Darnell's main argument, that Katimala was a forerunner to the fervency of Piye, in an attempt to defend his own chronological hypothesis of the period. This chronology is a debate which does not concern us here, but from this we can at least assert that fervency for Amun was not especially uncommon in Kush, and so the possibility of Piye's seemingly exaggerated zeal being real personal devotion becomes more realistic than when studied purely from an insular Egyptian angle.

Now that we have seen that this level of religious fervency may not have been particularly uncommon for the Kushite rulers, we must examine the evidence for Piye's campaign being an outworking of this fervour, instead of simply a political masquerade. An interesting fact that is often neglected is the timing of his expedition northwards, to coincide with the inundation. Only Török (2002, p.18) makes note of it, saying that it

was consciously coordinated with the New Year and thus with the Nile flood. The

King acted...as bringer of the inundation and was, indirectly, identified with it.

He also notes in the same place how this displays Piye's expedition as a religious pilgrimage instead of a mainly political expedition, as well as his presenting himself as a triumphal

warrior who destroyed the forces of chaos and restored order to a decaying Egypt at the same time. Thus Piye had deliberately timed his movements to be symbolic of a new start for Egypt, in that he was bringing new life in the same way as the silt from south brought new life to the land, which Egypt relied on to continue functioning properly. While all this may be passed off by some as purely religious propaganda to justify his actions, it cannot be escaped that if this was the case, his actions would have been motivated purely by the movements of Tefnakht in the north, and not with any meaningful parallel with the Nile flood, as seems clear from the timing of his campaign. It is interesting that none who argue for Piye's campaign as a primarily political one have confronted this evidence at all.

We have seen how his devoutness may not be unusual, and that it is probable that his campaign was timed to give a message of revival to the people of Egypt: but now we will turn to the inscription itself. On it Piye consciously uses Classic Middle Egyptian phrases and language to give a theme of cultural revival – Piye is returning Egypt to the glorious past (Ritner, 2009, pp.466-467). The stele itself almost quotes a number of well-known Middle Kingdom texts, most notably "rest the bow and loosen the arrow", which is almost directly taken from the tale of Sinuhe (Gardiner, 1935, p.220 n3). This deliberate evoking of classical literary styles is surely a subtle way of denoting a renewal in fortunes, and strengthens further the image of a return to the days of cultural wealth, presumably when Amun was worshipped truly, before Egypt descended into the "chaos" caused by the Libyans. With this, it is interesting to note how the stele is very careful to "slip" into the vernacular when Piye's enemies speak (Ritner, 2009, p.466), further implying that only Piye is capable of the revival he intends, for only he understands the cultural heritage of Egypt, and his mastery of the classic language gives a stark juxtaposition between himself and his enemies. Further to this, Gozzoli (2006, p.57) notes that "In Piye's text, the defeated rulers bow themselves down to the Nubian King, give him their symbols of power, but more importantly, they recognize the

supremacy of Piye from a religious point of view". He also notes the intriguing iconography of the lunette, where Piye is not facing the gods, as is usual, but is ahead of them, facing outward from them, as the defeated rulers bow down. He takes this as implying Piye's self-perceived role as intermediary between Amun and the other rulers, chosen to be king by Amun (this is made very clear from the victory stele and his sandstone stele), and has the power to attack those opposed to him on Amun's behalf, in this case Tefnakht. While Tefnakht moves in the north, Piye does nothing. But when He moves against the power of Amun, in the form of Piye, action is taken. It can be seen then, that Piye displayed himself as Amun's representative on earth, with power to actively defend the deity's interests, in bringing about a restoration in his name.

The text on the stele is not the only indication as to his belief in his god-given role. Török (2008, p.324) notes that "Piankhi also adopted the throne name Wsr-M3't-R', "Re is one whose order is strong", suggesting a program of the restoration of traditional order". He also notes in the same place that Piye imitated the Nebty and Horus names of Thutmose III, strengthening this assertion and clarifying his at least official desire to restore order to Egypt. The evidence above points, therefore, to a ruler not simply conquering for political motives – there seems to simply be too much emphasis on his religious piety and desire to return Egypt to true worship, far more than that necessary for a mere justification for political action.

Piye was certainly remembered not as a conquering overlord, but as a just and great ancestor: He was later deified, with examples such as "Piankhi-yerike-qa" – "Begotten of the deified Piankhi" (Macadam, 1949, p.73). Posterity remembered him well as a holy king who ruled by the will of Amun. He commenced extensive building work at the temple of Amun at Gebel Barkal, and Grimal (1995, p.340) theorizes that to the Kushites, "The Gebel Barkal temple was therefore a replica of the temple of Amun in Karnak" and notes how each king after Piye enlarged upon it, in much the same way had been done at Karnak. Perhaps his work

there was a deliberate attempt to start this trend, or was simply an expression of the power and resources that had been given to him by his god. Piye's stele is certainly not an isolated example of Amun "fundamentalism", but is a part of a wider context in which Piye can be seen to be attempting to recreate a time of prosperity and devotion to the god that he worshipped. Myśliwiec (2000, p.84) notes "the perfection with which stress is apportioned and appropriate proportions are maintained with regard to its political and religious aspects", in a "carefully thought-out and didactic manner". This should demonstrate to us how the stele was a carefully planned way to present Piye in the way that he wanted to be remembered – not as a master political lord, but primarily as a worshipper of Amun.

As can be seen from even this short discussion of the various sources concerning the nature of Piye's victory, no definite answers can be found as to the true motivations behind his expedition north. However, it is hoped that the arguments put forward here are persuasive. Piye focused on the religious aspect of the expedition far more than the militaristic on his stele, which would be expected on the self-flattering inscriptions of a conquering overlord, and he gives a seemingly unusual amount of devotion to Amun. However, when we view the history of the Kushites, such as queen Katimala, this fervency becomes more normal for the culture, and thus should not surprise us. The style of the stele also has been carefully thought out to give an indication of Piye's return to classic Egyptian power – when Amun was truly worshipped – and displays a theme of cultural revitalization by citing major classic works and Egyptian poetical styles. The imitating of specific throne names of Thutmose III, a great pharaoh of the past, and the presentation of the Libyans as those who do not understand the glory of Egypt are also no coincidence either, and show us Piye's view of himself as the restorer of Egypt under the worship of Amun. However we interpret the monument, perhaps the stele's most useful function for the Egyptologist is the snapshot it gives us of the political map in the time of Piye, an incredible monument considering its isolated position in Egyptian

and Kushite history, an inscription with remarkable literary qualities rising monolithically out of the relative darkness of the Third Intermediate Period. Perhaps the motivations behind the actions narrated upon it could be better examined if more evidence survived from contemporaneous sources, such as from Nimlot, or Pediese. Until then, however, the argument that Piye viewed his campaign as primarily a religious cleansing is put forward tentatively until further evidence supporting or contradicting this comes to light.

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What was the significance of the Vietnam War for the Cold War?

This essay will examine the significance of the conflict in Vietnam on the Cold War, primarily focussing on the aftermath for the main global superpower involved, the United States of America (USA). This conflict has had a long standing legacy for the geopolitical conduct of the USA leading to a period of transition in Cold War diplomacy and analysis of the legitimacy of intervention in states such as Vietnam. It also led to the reassessment of media coverage of Cold War conflicts, indeed any USA conflicts since. As such this essay will address the issues for foreign policy makers during the Cold War when conflicts are so openly presented to domestic audiences and the strategies that were adopted by USA leaders after these events. For many the Vietnam War represents a watershed when the USA was seemingly experiencing a moment of 'defeat and destabilisation' and had to reassess its approach to the Cold War, this idea will also be analysed while addressing the essay question.[1]

The first and most obvious impact on the Cold War to come out of the conflict in Vietnam is the fact the USA lost. For Alan Dobson and Steven Marsh, Vietnam saw the end of an American 'arrogance of power'.[2] When pursuing Cold War policies in 'Third World' countries, the USA largely operated from a position of absolute confidence in their military might in order to intimidate and cajole opposition powers and bend them to the American will. This was largely due to the belief that this strategy was the most expedient way of fulfilling the ideals of 'Containment', the USA's policy as derived from George F. Kennan to instigate 'long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies'.[3] The USA entered Vietnam with the expectation of a swiftly fought victory

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[1] E., Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes 1914-1991*, (London: Abacus, 1995), p. 244.
[2] A. P., Dobson, and S., Marsh (eds.), *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, (London: Routledge: 2001), p. 76.
[3] J.L., Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.4.

against the spread of Communist ideals into South Vietnam, and the greater South-East Asian area.[4] This was soon seen as a grossly naïve appraisal of the war that was going to be fought in the jungles of Vietnam. Conventional war was not fought by the North Vietnamese and the USA's persistence in pursuing a limited war to attain Cold War objectives, against a highly motivated and entirely dedicated opposition led to the futile loss of not just American soldiers but the utter devastation of the country they were trying to save from Communism.[5]

The significance for the Cold War here for the USA, a point ignored by the Russians as they experienced their own chastening experience in Afghanistan, was that conventional military might did not translate into the ability to manifest power in various theatres of the Cold War. The most notable individual to fail in understanding this point early in the Vietnam War was Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, who in a memo in October 1966 to then president Lyndon B. Johnson pointed out that:

> 'One thing demonstrably going for us in Vietnam over the past year has been the number of enemy killed in action resulting from the big military operations'.[6]

The various complex motivations for North Vietnamese combatants, those of anti-colonialism, nationalism and Communist ideals, were seemingly misunderstood. The conflict was treated too simplistically as a product of 'Containment' that could be won by killing the enemy. Vietnam served as a wake-up call that the battle of 'hearts and minds' had to be won, as those people you are looking to keep free from Communism may in fact not find it constructive having full blown conflict fought in their communities.[7]

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[4] A. P., Dobson, and S., Marsh (eds.), *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, p.77.

[5] A. P., Dobson, and S., Marsh (eds.), *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, p.89.

[6] J., Nashel, 'The Road to Vietnam: Modernisation Theory in Fact and Fiction' in Appy, C.G. (ed.), *Cold War Constructions*, (Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), p.146.

[7] J.,Schell, 'The Long Shadow of Vietnam', in J., Roper (ed.), *The United States and the Legacy of the Vietnam War, (London*: Palgrave, 2007), p23.

Beyond these lessons the USA also had to re-evaluate the policy of 'Containment' in light of their Vietnamese experience. It was no longer seen as practical to treat Communism as some 'monolithic' entity that put 'vital US interests at stake everywhere'.[8] Instead after the 1968 presidential election of Richard Nixon there was a more nuanced approach to Cold War power balances. Rather than approaching Communism as a solid ideological camp, it was better understood that during the Vietnam War the major Communist powers, Russia and China, had not acted in an entirely conducive way. They had each separately provided material for the North Vietnamese, but they were engaged in frosty diplomatic relations over the 'soul of the Vietnamese struggle'.[9] Here Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger saw a more practical means of foreign policy that moved away from the limited structures of the dichotomy of Cold War geopolitics. Rather than treating the global balance of power as a 'zero sum game' in which 'gains' for one side meant 'losses' for the other the USA began to take into account that Communism could be engaged to check Communism.[10] As such there began increased diplomatic relations between the USA and both of these large Communist powers. Soviet-Sino relations were at an all-time low in 1969, and it was judged that the USA take advantage of this to diplomatically contact the powers separately and move toward the multilateral power dynamic that Nixon and Kissinger sought, as stated by Kissinger:

> "If relations could be developed with both the Soviet Union and China the triangular relationship would provide us with a greater opportunity for peace"[11]

Overall Vietnam helped to highlight the weaknesses and deficiencies of the USA's foreign policy for the steadily diversifying theatre of international diplomacy. It gave rise to a greater

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[8] A. P., Dobson, and S., Marsh (eds.), *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, p.89.
[9] S.J., Ball, *The Cold War: An International History 1947-1991*, (London: Arnold, 1998), p. 136.
[10] J.L., Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p.277.
[11] R. B., Levering, *The Cold War: A Post Cold War History,* (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1994), p.131.

understanding that the call for ultimate victory over the Communist's was inapplicable, particularly if the USA was unable to understand and conclude a conflict such as that in Vietnam. Therefore links with China and Russia should be stabilised in a 'semi-permanent structure of international relations' to maintain peace.[12]

However this view of foreign policy was not held by many individuals within Congress and it was following the disaster in Vietnam that these dissident voices came much more to the fore of American politics. Prior to Vietnam there had been to the largest extent a consensus within American society on the direction and purpose of foreign policy.[13]There was no longer one view on the USA's correct role in world affairs. As previously examined during this essay there was not complete faith in the aims and objectives of 'Containment' as it had previously manifested itself. Instead Nixon and Kissinger sought a balance and greater diplomacy between the superpowers; in short the USA was now entering the period of Détente.[14] This policy was divisive though. For many the idea of managing parity with the Soviet Union in the wake of such an embarrassing defeat in Vietnam seemed illogical.[15] This was to be a defining aspect in the management of Cold War foreign policy within the USA after Vietnam. The policies and actions of the executive were not in line with the views of public or congressional consensus all of the time due to the fact that many no longer took the views of the president as the overriding guide for foreign policy.[16]

There were a variety of reasons for this new found lack of faith in the leadership of the president in foreign policy, though Vietnam is clearly the most significant during this period. The policies that led to the USA's involvement within the conflict under various administrations had been allowed to go ahead due to the belief that presidential leadership

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[12] S.J., Ball, *The Cold War: An International History 1947-1991, 00*p. 141.
[13] R. B., Levering, *The Cold War: A Post Cold War History*, p. 146.
[14] S.J., Ball, *The Cold War: An International History 1947-1991*, p. 171.
[15] S.J., Ball, *The Cold War: An International History 1947-1991*, p. 171.
[16] R. B., Levering*, The Cold War: A Post Cold War History*, p. 147.

was the way forward for a strong check on Communism. Throughout the '50s and '60s billions of tax payers' dollars were dutifully voted through Congress to aid the fight on Communism in Indochina, a blind eye was turned to the full extent of CIA operations on the ground and American people were systematically manipulated and lied to by the administrations they had voted into power.[17] These facts would be revealed throughout the early '70s in a variety of ways but none more telling than those published as part of the 'Pentagon Papers'. These leaked documents had a considerable effect on the backing that presidential foreign policy could rely upon. It helped to sway some people in their view that the government had long known the commitment into Vietnam had been a mistake.[18] This combined with the decision to try and suppress additional excerpts further fed the fires that the presidency had been abusing the trust of the people with regard to Vietnam. It was only logical to apply scrutiny to future presidential decisions in the Cold War to avoid this in the future.[19]

In this regard the Vietnam War also provides a significant change within the Cold War context. It illustrated the ability of domestic opinion to shape and change the actions of the USA in foreign policy. The shattering of consensus that followed the Vietnam War was seen most clearly in the actions and protests of the period on home soil. This pressured those in power and helped push through the eventual withdrawal from the conflict. The spectre of a pointless conflict that hung over the USA with few tangible results would help shape the way those in power would engage in the Cold War.[20] For many of those in office at the time this change in public opinion was largely due to the media representation of the conflict and its undermining effects, for instance the publishing of the 'Pentagon Papers'.[21] This has led to

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[17] R. B., Levering, *The Cold War: A Post Cold War History*, p. 147.

[18] R.D., Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.290.

[19] R.D., Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.291.

[20] R.D., Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.333.

[21] D.C., Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, (London: University of California Press, 1986), p. 211.

the creation of an argument centred on a kind of 'stab in the back' regarding the defeat in Vietnam. Famously Dean Rusk when asked about the reason for defeat in Vietnam by Nixon suggested it "it was lost in the editorial rooms of this country".[22] The will of the country appears to have given out in this appraisal of the defeat in Vietnam, and this is significant for the Cold War as it suggests that the will to defeat Communism in the USA could be undermined by the effects of the media. In addition to this however it must be accepted that the media and its effects on public opinion were in reality part of the greater feeling of contempt for the progress of the war. It was a 'limited war' that had far outstripped the constraints and costs that the American people and indeed policymakers had originally expected.[23]

Regardless which analysis appears most apt, what cannot be ignored is the level of secrecy, censorship and suppression that would occur following Vietnam with regard to American involvement in conflicts. 'Americanisation' of Cold War conflicts would not occur en masse ever again. The suggestion that American troops being thrown into another Vietnam for the domestic audience to see was tantamount to political suicide. Instead policies of proxy wars such as those fought throughout the 'Third World' were adopted as a way of continuing the Cold War fight, without the overt American losses that the Vietnam War incurred. It had created a 'persistent distrust of public institutions and the officials who ran them' and a fear of another fruitless conflict and mass American losses.[24] The media remained a key cog in presenting this to the public for the remainder of the Cold War.

Overall this essay has examined the significant effects that the Vietnam War had upon the conduct of the USA during the Cold War and how this affected foreign policy and balance of international power. It has analysed the limitations of the war effort and the effects

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[22] J.,Schell, 'The Long Shadow of Vietnam', p.28.
[23] D.C., Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, p.213.
[24] R.D., Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, pp.335-36.

of defeat on the geopolitical strategies of the USA and its contribution to the adoption of Détente. Reference has been made to the undermining effects that the Vietnam War had for popular consensus on foreign policy and trust in the executive on the domestic front, paying attention to the way the media was involved in this. Finally it has shown that the legacy of the Vietnam War was felt throughout the rest of the Cold War in the distrust that the public had for its institutions and how this shaped USA policy with regard to the use of American troops. The analysis of this essay and the points it has explored are neatly summarised by the historian Robert Schulzinger as he states:

> 'American leaders conducted their foreign and military policies from the 1970s to the early years of the twenty-first century with an eye to their unhappy experiences in the Vietnam War.'[25]

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[25] R.D., Schulzinger, *A Time for Peace*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 183.

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Report on Venantius Fortunatus' *Life of Radegund*

Examples of Christian literature concerning the saints, known as hagiography, date back to the second century and were prolific throughout the middle ages. One such man best noted for his hagiographical texts as well as his poetry was Venantius Fortunatus. Venantius was born circa 530 in Treviso, Italy and after studying in Ravenna, he travelled across Europe to Gaul. Here he became truly successful, writing a substantial number of literary works for high-ranking political and ecclesiastical figures in Merovingian society. At Poitiers, Venantius met the Frankish Queen Radegund and the two remained close friends. Following her death and canonisation in 587, Venantius began writing her biography, the *Life of Radegund*. He was later elected Bishop of Poitiers around the year 600. The *vita* describes Radegund's transition from a Thuringian princess to becoming a devout nun in the monastery of the Holy Cross at Poitiers. Venantius focuses on Radegund's ascetic practices during her time as both queen and as a nun. Venantius uses the conventional topoi of monastic lives, humility, piety and self-denial, as the main themes in this text and emphasises them throughout.[1] He paints an extreme picture of humility and asceticism with his descriptions of Radegund's violent self-aggression and her ardent domestic service to those less fortunate. Venantius' writing noticeably reflects his great affection for Radegund; one of the reasons he wrote the hagiography was to promote the saint's sanctity. In addition, his close relationship with the saint brings a certain amount of credibility to his work. In regards to the *Life of Radegund*'s use as a historical source, it remains particularly important for the knowledge of early medieval society and Christianity. It offers historians an understanding of the social and cultural history of Merovingian Gaul as well as the general attitudes and spiritual mentality of people living in this period. However, there are limits to its value as a historical source as

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[1] Wemple, (1981), p. 183.

both the authorship and the time at which it was written affect its reliability as an accurate historical representation. The passages selected from *Life of Radegund* for this essay are chapters 2, 15, 19 and 34. They have been selected for the insights and understanding they offer in regards to different aspects of early medieval history. Due to the absence of sentence numbers, for ease of referencing, I have subdivided the chapters into smaller numbered sections, indicated by brackets.

2. [1] The most blessed Radegund was of the highest earthly rank, born from the seed of the kings of the barbarian nation of Thuringia. Her grandfather was King Bassin, her paternal uncle, Hermanfred and her father, King Bertechar. But she surpassed her lofty origin by even loftier deeds. [2] She had lived with her noble family only a little while when the victorious Franks devastated the region with barbaric turmoil and, like the Israelites, she departed and migrated from her homeland. [3] The royal girl became part of the plunder of these conquerors and they began to quarrel over their captive. If the contest had not ended with an agreement for her disposition, the kings would have taken up arms against one another. [4] Falling to the lot of the illustrious King Clothar, she was taken to Athies in Vermandois, a royal villa, and her upbringing was entrusted to guardians. [5] The maiden was taught letters and other things suitable to her sex and she would often converse with other children there about her desire to be a martyr if the chance came in her time. [6] Thus even as an adolescent, she displayed the merits of a mature person. She obtained part of what she sought, for, though the church was flourishing in peace, she endured persecution from her own household. While but a small child, she herself brought the scraps left at table to the gathered children, washing the head of each one, seating them on little chairs and offering water for their hands, and she mingled with the infants herself. She would also carry out what she had planned beforehand with Samuel, a little cleric. [7] Following his lead, carrying a wooden cross they had made, singing psalms, the children would troop into the oratory as somber as adults. Radegund herself would polish the pavement with her dress and, collecting the drifting dust around the altar in a napkin, reverently placed it outside the door rather than sweep it away. [8] When the aforementioned king, having provided the expenses, wished to bring her to Vitry she escaped by night from Athies through Beralcha with a few companions. When he settled with her that she should be made his queen at Soissons, she avoided the trappings of royalty, so she would not grow great in

the world but in Him to Whom she was devoted and she remained unchanged by earthly glory.

In this first passage, Venantius portrays the Frankish invasion of Thuringia as unjustified, giving no context as to the cause of the war.[2] However a contemporary of Venantius, Gregory of Tours gives details of a provoked Frankish attack in his *History of the Franks*. Seeking sole rule of Thuringia, Radegund's uncle Hermanfred had killed his brothers; Bertechar, who was Radegund's father, and Baderic. Gregory describes how Hermanfred broke his agreement with the Frankish King Theuderic, who had helped him defeat Baderic in return for half of Thuringia.[3] He then continued to aggravate Theuderic with a 'violent attack' on his lands and with the slaughter of large numbers of Frankish hostages.[4] According to Gregory of Tours, these actions led to the Franks invasion. Venantius purposefully omits the Thuringian atrocities in his text since it would portray Radegund's family in an unfavourable light, diminishing her noble lineage. The *vita* is also a useful source of information on warfare and the conquest of Thuringia. He emphasises the destructive effect of Frankish conquests during this period[5] and also the violent nature of rulers, with the Frankish kings prepared to take up arms against each other for the right to Radegund.[6] Venantius also provides important information on female education. Due to her royal status Radegund was given a good education, eventually becoming learned in Latin, rhetoric and the writings of the church.[7] Radegund's noble position and high education enabled her to make her voice prominent in church, domestic and political affairs. This reveals that even in a time of gender inequality, certain women of a high status did enjoy a degree of influence and freedom. Likewise

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[2] Venantius, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 2.2.
[3] Gregory of Tours, *History of the Franks* 3.
[4] Gregory of Tours, *History of the Franks* 3.7.
[5] Venantius, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 2.2.
[6] Venantius, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 2.3.
[7] Venantius, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 2.5.

Venantius demonstrates the significance of royal marriages in diplomatic scenarios and its use as a tool to gain benefits in Merovingian society. By wedding himself to Radegund, Clothar took advantage of her royal status and was tactically able to consolidate his dominance over Thuringia.

15. [1] From there, in decorous manner, she approached the villa of Saix near the aforesaid town in the territory of Poitiers, her journey ever prospering. Who could recount the countless remarkable things she did there or grasp the special quality of each one? [2] At table she secretly chewed rye or barley bread which she had hidden under a cake to escape notice. [3] For from the time she was veiled, consecrated by Saint Medard, even in illness, she ate nothing but legumes and green vegetables: not fruit nor fish nor eggs. And she drank no drink but honeyed water or perry and would touch no undiluted wine nor any decoction of mead or fermented beer. [4] Then, emulating Saint Germanus' custom, she secretly had a millstone brought to her. Throughout the whole of Quadragesima, she ground fresh flour with her own hands. [5] She continuously distributed each offering to local religious communities, in the amount needed for the meal taken every four days. [6] With that holy woman, acts of mercy were no fewer than the crowds who pressed her; as there was no shortage of those who asked, so was there no shortage in what she gave so that, wonderfully, they could all be satisfied. Where did the exile get such wealth? Whence came the pilgrim's riches?

This second section holds historical interest concerning the transition of sainthood over the centuries is demonstrated. Radegund's fasting is as part of self-mortification is fuelled by her desire to overcome her weakness and achieve salvation.[8] In times of persecution, one could achieve salvation through martyrdom, however, in this period, one had to suffer throughout life to become closer to God. This confirms that saintly recognition changed over history to reflect the social standards of the time. The repetition of the word 'secretly', both in

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[8] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 15.3.

describing Radegund's fasting and her grinding of flour during Quadragesima has significance. Here and in other sections of the *vita*, Venantius he conveys the idea that he is revealing the secrets of saintliness, while at the same time demonstrating his own authority as the honoured observer of the holy saint.[9]

In grinding flour and baking bread for the community, Radegund imitates exactly the actions of St Germanus. The explicit reference to St Germanus suggests that Venantius may have been relying on literal re-creations of past miracles to emphasise Radegund's holiness. Furthermore, Venantius provides instructions for good Christian behaviour. In this paragraph in particular, Radegund demonstrates admirable Christian virtues such as devotion, humility, generosity and kindness. This is historically significant as it illustrates the dominance of religion in Merovingian society and the attempts of writers to shape the public according to the Christian ideals through hagiography. Radegund's remarkable deeds such as her self-mortification and her charitable activities also offer an important model for saintly behaviour. Her miraculous feats set a certain precedence for other saintly miracles.

19. [1] Doesn't this make one shudder, this thing she did so sweetly? When lepers arrived and, sounding a warning, came forward, she directed her assistant to inquire with pious concern whence they came or how many there were. [2] Having learned that, she had a table laid with dishes, spoons, little knives, cups and goblets, and wine and she went in herself secretly that none might see her. [3] Seizing some of the leprous women in her embrace, her heart full of love, she kissed their faces. Then, while they were seated at table, she washed their faces and hands with warm water and treated their sores with fresh unguents and fed each one. [4] When they were leaving she offered small gifts of gold and clothing. [5] To this there was scarcely a single witness, but the attendant presumed to chide her softly: "Most holy lady, when you have embraced lepers, who will kiss you?" [6] Pleasantly, she answered: "Really, if you won't kiss me, it's no concern of mine."

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[9] Wehlau, (2002), p. 79.

The third passage early medieval Christian ideas of sanctity and piety. Here, Venantius describes the practice of self-mortification and the belief that it would allow to become godlier. Radegund suffers through her close contact with the heavily diseased lepers.[10] Venantius promotes the image of her suffering to make her worthy of Christian martyrs who had suffered before her. However, in other sources there are few references to Radegund's extreme tortures. Gregory of Tours makes no reference to such activities and in Baudonivia's *vita* of the saint, she very rarely mortifies herself. Therefore Venantius may have been embellishing certain events in order to enhance her claim as a martyr. The *vita* demonstrates additional historical value, as it confirms that even those from the highest ranks of society were getting involved in charitable, typically monastic activities. Venantius promotes this charitable behaviour throughout and ultimately provides an important model for female piety aimed at noble and royal holy women.[11] He stresses how they can use their wealth and influence to improve the welfare of the community, as Radegund does.[12] The passage also reveals interesting perspectives on the importance of social status in Frankish society. Throughout her life Radegund is seen constantly rejecting the traditional female roles of wife and mother. Venantius also emphasises that her desire to live a holy life conflicts directly with her role as queen and her royal status.[13] Radegund's dedication to sexual abstinence previously incited mockery in the royal court. In this passage, Radegund undermines her queenly status by caring for and serving the lepers in a domestic manner. Her attendant clearly finds Radegund's actions distasteful, scolding her behaviour.[14] This is historically significant as it indicates that a deliberate disregard for one's social status in early medieval

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[10] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 19.3.

[11] Coon, (1997), p. 127.

[12] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 19.4.

[13] Glenn, (2011), p. 60.

[14] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 19.5.

society was shunned and could dramatically affect reputation and public opinion. As a historical source, the *vita* enhances the knowledge of medieval notions on sanctity in the sixth century. As in many other hagiographical works, the author presents the saint's detachment from her worldly restrictions and the judgement of others, in this case so that Radegund can perform charitable deeds.[15] She persists in renouncing her worldly station in order to gain a heavenly status.[16] Therefore one can attest that religious beliefs in this period dictated that the transgression of social norms does not serve as a barrier for her pursuit of sanctity.

> 34. [1] When one of the monachus closest to her suffered because her eye was flooded with a bloody humor, she laid hold of some wormwood which the saint had about her breast for refreshment. [2] When she placed it on her eye, the pain and blood soon fled and, from the freshness of the herb, the eye was suddenly clear and bright again. And that reminds me of something I almost passed by in silence. [3] Children were born to the blessed one's agent, Andered, but he scarcely saw them before he lost them and the sorrowing mother had to think about burying her child even while birthing it. [4] During the preparations, the tearful parents wrapped the lifeless babe in the saint's hair cloth. [5] As soon as the infant's body touched that most medicinal garment and those noble rags, he came back from the dead to normal life. Blushing away his tomblike pallor, he rose from the mantle.

This passage firstly offers valuable insights into spiritual mentality of people in Merovingian Gaul. Here Venantius highlights the presence of disease, reflecting a century in which epidemic outbreaks of plague were sweeping across Gaul.[17] He presents forth the medieval notion that holy people could transfer divine powers to close objects illustrated by the magical healing powers of the wormwood and of Radegund's hair cloth.[18] The idea that

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[15] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 19.6.

[16] Effros, (1990), p. 45.

[17] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 34.1.

[18] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 34.

objects and people in physical proximity to saints would receive powers was widely recognised in the early medieval period as can be seen in the abundance of prized holy relics. From this, it is clear that people in this period believed strongly in the supernatural, in particular the idea that god's powers could, at any time, interfere in their lives. Ruth Wehlau suggests that Venantius emphasised so much of the *vita* on Radegund's ascetic actions in order to promote this concept that the saint's body is a holy place and a source of divine power.[19] Moreover, it is likely that Venantius' own experiences dramatically strengthened his belief in such miracles and also may have reflected his representation of such events. In striking similarity to the afflicted nun, Venantius was cured of an eye disease by the relics of St Martin. Furthermore, the fact that the afflicted nun is cured by Radegund in the monastery, where several of her other miracles take place is significant. Venantius represents monasteries as very holy places where miracles often occurred; locations in which God's powers could be harnessed for the good of society. Furthermore the case of high infant mortality in this passage offers a beneficial understanding of the general living conditions and features of Frankish society in sixth century.[20] An occurrence such as this generally signifies a low standard of living involving poor nutrition, environmental conditions and sanitation and suggests an undeveloped medical infrastructure in society.

To conclude, this essay has demonstrated the great value of the *Life of Radegund* for the study of early medieval history in many different ways. It gives understanding to the spiritual mentality and religious attitudes of people in Merovingian society as well as giving evidence of the conditions in society and social ideals. It gives details of warfare and also offers insight into early medieval Christianity and religious values. However the text does pose certain

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[19] Wehlau, (2002), p.75.
[20] Venantius Fortunatus, *The Life of the Holy Radegund* 34.3.

problems. *Vitae* generally follow traditional formulas. Venantius for example used Sulpicius Severus' *Vita Martini* as a model for the Life of Radegund. This resulted in a focus on Radegund's eremitic ideals in reflecting with those of St Martin. In this way Venantius overlooks the documentation of other important historical events, making the *vita* less reliable as a source for the study of early medieval history, one such example being the saint's founding of her monastery. His own agenda may have affected the reliability of this work. Many hagiographers of the medieval period wished to establish themselves as devout disciples of the saint. Venantius believed no doubt that his intercession with the saint earned him celestial favour. In general the text offers a distorted portrayal of Merovingian royalty. Venantius himself earned 'favour and patronage' from several prominent Merovingian Kings, no doubt his promotion to Bishop of Poitiers was helped by this.[21] Venantius jumps abruptly over the end of the building of Holy Cross monastery which is described in Baudonivia's hagiography. The poet may have found this account too unfavourable to the Merovingian King Clothar, whereas Baudonivia, writing later, may not have been concerned with such repercussions.

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[21] Coates, (2000), p. 1109.

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What is the significance to the historian of

Joseph Warren's 'The Boston Massacre Oration' (1772)?

Joseph Warren's Boston Massacre Oration is a valuable source given the contemporary narrative of pre-revolutionary tensions it was produced in; and can tell us a great deal about the socio-political landscape it contextualised. Aimed at the eager ears of colonials and patriots, Warren's oration tells a story of unrest and opposition to the authority of Britain and her crown at a time where colonial-British tensions mounted in social, political, and economic terms. Warren's narrative attempts to both villainize the British with its policies of tyranny and violent oppression as well as romanticise the colonial ethos, one craving liberty. Warren's narrative goes on at great length to embed the American Patriot agenda into a mass colonial audience, using a basis of unjust political action and violent oppression as a means to voice concern and broaden the patriot ethos. Using the iconic Boston Massacre as a catalyst for the growing movement which would lead to revolution, Warren's primary goal is to consolidate a collective colonial desire to hold "all the liberties and immunities of British subjects, [which] were confined to this province, as fully and as absolutely as they possibly could be by any human instrument which can be devised."[1] Warren's oration is significant not only in inferring the historian towards concerns that faced colonial opposition (for example unconsented taxation), but also as a means of understanding the use of propaganda to slander and undermine the British, helping us to see how and why the colonial stance was consolidated into the anti-British, soon to be revolutionary movement it was.

From both colonial and British perspectives, the Boston Massacre was undoubtedly perceived as a grim and unwelcome event. On the one hand, the British understood that the

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[1] Dr Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.

use of violence against Bostonians, regardless of its provocation, would be received with further hostility and exacerbate current mounting tensions. Similarly, it is crude to suggest that the voice of colonial opposition would welcome the death of its constituents as a means to an end of putting pressure on British authority. However, this is not to suggest that events of such a nature could not be used to a critical degree, and the Boston Massacre did indeed heavily influence the revolutionary narrative in the following months and years. It offered a method of creating leverage against British occupation and political authority, and in addition promoted an American patriot agenda which would ultimately sweep the colonies into revolution and war. As Henry J. Halko posits, "in the aftermath of the massacre the troops were withdrawn from the town, and in the aftermath of the trials no one seemed to remember the acquittals. The massacre, commemorated until 1784, quickly became enshrined in patriotic folklore and unprovoked butchery, the spilling of innocent blood."[2] Undoubtedly, the massacre was used to the advantage of colonial opposition, who clouded the event through an interpretation of anti-British propaganda, and Joseph Warren's oration encapsulates this agenda wholeheartedly. Throughout his narrative, Warren takes articulate consideration in depicting British authority across the Atlantic, as well as its branches within the colonies as abusive, tyrannical, and repressive whenever he can.

In terms of violent brutality, no one segment reflects this sentiment more so than his account of the Boston Massacre itself. He claims, "The horrors of THAT DREADFUL NIGHT are but too deeply impressed on our hearts. Language is too feeble to paint the emotions of our souls, when our streets were stained with the BLOOD OF OUR BRETHERN; when our ears were wounded by the groans of the dying, and our eyes were tormented with the sight of the mangled bodies of the dead."[3] Warren projected a brutal and

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[2] Henry J Halko, 'Review of, 'The Boston Massacre'' by Hiller B. Zobel, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 1970), pp. 677.
[3] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.

malicious British occupation and used graphic and somewhat glorified descriptions such as this to promote patriotic sentiments and inspire the masses by juxtaposing them personally into the cause. A. Schlesinger has argued that "the fomenters of direct action traded on the fact that the bulk of mankind are more led by their senses than by their reason."[4] Warren capitalises on the use of an emotive narrative here that certainly consolidated feelings of anger, loss and disassociation with the British to reinforce a growing notion of revolutionary entitlement. Whilst undoubtedly that night resonated in infamy with Bostonians, its underlying legacy was one that could be perceived as a celebration; of opposition, unity, and sacrifice, which aided the progression of a revolutionary goal. Warren's description of the Boston Massacre utilizes a victimising embodiment of its colonial constituency, strengthening gains to the collective patriotic cause by highlighting and romanticising the "innocent blood" which had been spilled to achieve it.[5] The massacre itself, "quickly penetrated the mainstream of American mythology, if not history, its victims transformed into the first martyrs of American independence," and its living memory moulded around an ethos of social change and uprising.[6] Warren's oration channelled this movement and used victimising representations of Bostonian-British interaction. His suggestion that "whilst in a naked defenceless state, [colonials] are frequently insulted and abused by an armed soldiery" would validate resultant patriot actions as just in a cause against British oppression.[7]

Continuing with this focus on Warren's interpretation of the Boston Massacre, his feelings towards the British soldiers involved, and by extension the entirety of British occupant soldiers, holds a completely unsympathetic view. He argues that, "they are instructed implicitly to obey their commanders, without inquiring into the justice of the cause

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[4] A. Schlesinger in, Jesse Lemisch, "Review: Radical Plot in Boston (1770). A Study in the Use of Evidence", *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Dec., 1970), pp. 487.
[5] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.
[6] Henry J Halko, 'Review of, 'The Boston Massacre'', pp. 675.
[7] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.

they are engaged to support: hence it is, that they are ever to be dreaded as the ready engines of tyranny and oppression."[8] He depicts them not only as extensions of the crown's tyranny, but the willing limbs of British oppression, sent with an iron fist to suppress a growing colonial voice concerned with the restrictions of their liberties. This lent to dehumanize them and the rest of Britain in the eyes of colonists and project them, in a sense, as slaves to the crown; mindless drones in lieu of the liberty to think or to choose, which in turn reinforced ideas surrounding America's own liberties and the necessity of fighting for them. Considering the contemporary "patriot claim that Massachusetts was the victim of a political plot against its liberties,"[9] British soldiers were then defined as the enforcers of this oppression and would be met with the same hostility as the policies they were tasked with implementing. As we know from the trials that followed the massacre, from a British perspective, the ethos that culminated in bloodshed of March 5 1770 was one of fear and provocation rather than maliciousness. This coincides with the view that "the soldiers thought they were about to be assaulted in such a manner that their lives were threatened."[10] Indeed whilst Bostonian unrest was founded on "a ministerial conspiracy aimed at their liberties... the troops on the other hand, confronting a hostile people not above verbal abuse, physical assault, and legal harassment, similarly felt aggrieved... Both town and soldiery believed the other determined on revenge."[11] Warren disregards the vulnerability that the British soldiers endured, as if to suggest these unwelcome and impoverished men relished the position they had been faced with, of whom many sentries "slept with loaded guns in fear of attack."[12] Choosing to overlook the aggressive provocation suffered in the lead up to the infamous incident, Warren's account is shaped to fit into an anti-British and pro-revolutionary agenda. Without

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[8] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.

[9] O. M. Dickerson, 'The Commissioners of Customs and the "Boston Massacre"', *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1954), p. 308.

[10] John Phillip Reid, 'A Lawyer Acquitted: John Adams and the Boston Massacre Trials', *The American Journal of Legal History*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul., 1974), pp. 198.

[11] Halko, 'Review of, 'The Boston Massacre'', pp. 676.

[12] Dickerson, 'The Commissioners of Customs and the "Boston Massacre"', pp. 310.

question, the voice of British authority across the Atlantic viewed the colonial political landscape as one concerned solely with the preservation and reinforcement of crown interests, one where Lord Chatham's view that "Great Britain protects America; America is bound to yield obedience" was common among Britain's influential constituents and political elite.[13] However, Warren's unsurprising opposition aims to villainize not just the policy makers, but the country as a whole, in particular Britain's representative soldiers stationed in the colonies. This would strengthen the divide between colony and mother-country on a new emerging social level, which compounded the already familiar political and economic spectrums; in turn reinforcing tensions as well as helping to consolidate America's own developing national image.

Importantly, provocations for violence sprung from both sides of the colonial-British divide and whilst each would argue that its hand had been forced by opposition action, it cannot be denied that in instances it strengthened the revolutionary cause. Historians have gone as far as to argue that events such as the Boston Massacre were the result of colonial impetus more carefully engineered than a melting pot tension reaching its natural culmination. Halko remarks that by the time of the massacre, "gone are the law-abiding Bostonians, the wronged citizenry bearing the oppression of military occupation. Mobs and riots... were virtually a tradition with them... which taught Boston's radical leaders the political uses of calculated terror."[14] Firstly, the immediate aftermath of the Boston Massacre marked a success for the patriots by instigating, "with united efforts... the immediate departure of the troops from the town... with a resolution which ensured success."[15] With British occupation being seen as a restriction of colonial liberties, a paradoxical effect of this was the consolidation of patriot authority in Massachusetts. Among the wealth of Warren's

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[13] Lord Chatham, House of Commons, January 14th 1766.
[14] Halko, 'Review of, 'The Boston Massacre'', pp. 676.
[15] Dr. Joseph Warren, Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772.

anti-British narrative, he brings up an interesting comparison between contemporary Britain and the fallen Roman empire, the importance of which cannot be understated in undermining the crown and rallying support for the revolutionary cause. Drawing similarities between the two, Warren's assessment is significant for several reasons. Firstly, he claims that it was "a free constitution, which raised ancient Rome from the smallest beginnings... the loss of this which plunged her from that summit, into the black gulf of infamy and slavery."[16] This influences the reader on multiple levels; by projecting the demise of civil order, authority, even society in a colonial context without the liberty of a free constitution, arguably also hinting at a looming collapse of British imperial authority in its entirety, each feeding into his anti-British agenda. Without question, "the patriots exhibited extraordinary skill in manipulating public opinion, playing upon the emotions of the ignorant as well as the minds of the educated," and Warren's oration does this brilliantly.[17] Whilst the colonial masses could feed off the notions of martyrdom and revolt brought up in his expression of the Boston Massacre, the educated and politically influential would have no doubt been sucked into Warren's empirical comparisons. This was surely a fascinating prospect for ordinary colonists, they feeling as if they had some historically significant understanding of the contemporary 'bigger picture', which was also theirs to mould.

He goes on to say, "when this degenerated into tyrants and oppressors; her senators forgetful of their dignity, and seduced by base corruption, betrayed their country."[18] This breeds two obvious contextual comparisons; relating the tyranny of Roman political authority with that of the crown and government, in addition to exampling measures of violent oppression to embody events such as the Boston Massacre more broadly. More subtly, it condemns other instances of violence, one of which resulted in patriot James Otis being "so

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[16] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.
[17] A. Schlesinger in, Jesse Lemisch, 'Review: Radical Plot in Boston', pp.487.
[18] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.

severely beaten that he might have been killed had not a passer-by rushed in."[19] Warren's comparative analysis reflects contemporary tensions with both crown authority, its military and political limbs in occupancy of the colonies, reinforcing a colonial aim for the liberty of a free constitution. Colonials felt betrayed by their mother country due to the inequality of their liberties with that of the British mainland populace, in response to which a growing notion of unity brewed among patriot constituents that helped in turn to mould a national image separate to Britain; rather than an extension of it. Indeed there are notions of American national identity that emerge from Warren's oration; however, his narrative chooses not to allude to a complete loss of hope for a colonial-British reconciliation. He states, "it is our earnest desire that she [Britain] may still continue to enjoy the same emoluments... only, let us have the pleasure of calling it our own... but this it seems is too great a favour: we are to be governed by the absolute commands of others."[20] This touches on a central topic of political tension between Britain and the colonies, in that taxation without representation was taken as an infringement of the liberties of the colonial constituency. Yet it is clear that in many cases it was not so much the policies colonials received from the crown that oppressed them (granted that additional taxes would unlikely be welcomed), so much as the fact that these policies were forced by crown authority; prior to the 1760s, government legislature pertaining to the colonies was weekly enforced and simply evaded or ignored.

In conclusion, Joseph Warren has produced an inspiring and historically important source that embodies much of the prevalent tensions between Britain and the colonies in the context of the build up to revolution. Warren's oration can be identified as a solidifying precursor to the revolutionary cause justified in a pursuit of "all the liberties and IMMUNITIES of British subjects."[21] In the months and years thereafter the Boston Massacre

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[19] Dickerson, 'The Commissioners of Customs and the "Boston Massacre"', pp. 309.
[20] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.
[21] Dr. Joseph Warren, 'Boston Massacre Oration, Boston, March 5, 1772'.

and Warren's oration two years later; tensions grew, violence erupted, revolution was strived for and America emerged. Whilst taking every opportunity to undermine and villainize Britain, Warren's oration also reflects a constituency that in contemporary terms still somewhat sheltered themselves under the umbrella of crown protection. However, as the narrative also tells us, these sentiments were receding as the political and economic divide between Britain as her colonies grew, until they became so alienated the social divide compounded into a cultural one, which saw America's own national identity stand to fight for its liberties rather than wait for Britain to grant her them.

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Was Romantic Love the Driving Force Behind Marriage Formation in Early Modern England?

In the modern era, it is widely accepted that the main driving force for marriage formation is romantic love. Yet, for English couples looking to marry in the Early Modern period, matters were complicated by an array of factors, such as social class, family interference and economic standing. The importance of studying this topic stems from England's status as one of the most progressive countries in Europe at this time, in terms of romantic marriages and the relative freedom to choose loving partners in different social circles.[1] Therefore, if there are any countries in which compassionate marriages were formed at this time, England would be an example we can draw the most information from. The importance of family influence and their social standings are explored in this piece, along with romantic love, as these were some of the main criteria identified by Houlbrooke in the making of an ideal Early Modern marriage.[2] This piece will consider what importance each criterion had in the making of an Early Modern marriage and how these factors interacted (or conflicted) with one another. Although some historians have drawn similarities between marriage in the modern era and the Early Modern period,[3] it is important to consider the institution of marriage in this period as completely different to today, in order to come to effective conclusion to the question. Considering the evidence in this piece, it can be argued that romantic love was the main driving force behind marriage in Early Modern England, and the other factors, such as social standing and financial resources, acted as antagonistic elements which may have constrained

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[1] Lawrence Stone, *The Family Sex and Marriage in England: 1500-1800* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 219-220.
Lawrence Stone, *Uncertain Unions: Marriage in England, 1660-1753* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 8.
[2] Ralph A. Houlbrooke, *English Family Life, 1576-1716: An Anthology from Diaries* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1988), pp. 73-74.
[3] Joanne Bailey, *Unquiet Lives: Marriage and Marriage Breakdown in England, 1660-1800*, ed. by Anthony Fletcher, John Guy, and John Morrill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 2.

freedom of choice, rather than being driving forces in their own right.

Romantic love in the Early Modern period was considered to be one of the essential components of a successful marriage, but the definition of the word 'love' was open to interpretation, covering aspects such as friendship and companionship as well as romantic connection.[4] This concept of romantic love being a deciding factor in marriage formation shows a progression from previous eras, in which love was considered to be a product of a marriage, rather than a prerequisite – and a move towards choosing partners on the basis of 'emotional satisfaction' rather than wealth or status was observed.[5] It is well-documented that romantic love played a significant role in marriage formation at this time, but whether it was actually the driving force is still very much open to debate. It is also important to remember that the practice of marriage formation in this period often differed to the theory laid out by moral practitioners in legislature or instructional literature, and regardless of any so-called moral constraints, romantic love was still widespread at this time, just like any other natural human emotion.[6] Therefore, it is very difficult to define romantic love as the driving force for marriage in a catch-all manner, as each marriage (indeed, each romantic relationship) would have been unique, dependent on its circumstances, as much as it is today. Society's attitude to romantic love, however, can be documented in a number of different ways, including popular culture. Macfarlane describes romantic love and the resulting conflicts as 'the most important single element dominating the plots'[7] in many dramatic works, which shows love to be an important subject in social conversation – and it seems that this is translated into the making of marriage as a major factor. Macfarlane, along with Lawrence Stone, stresses the effect that romantic love had in society at the time, stating that feelings of love could lead to

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[4] Houlbrooke, *English Family Life,* p.76.
[5] Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage*, p.217.
[6] Alan MacFarlane, *Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction, 1300-1840* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1986), p.175.
[7] *Ibid.,* p.184.

genuine psychosis,[8] and other medical ailments, owing to its status as the strongest of the human passions.[9] This would suggest that romantic love would be powerful force behind the making of marriage, purely because of the way in which it seemed to affect the human psyche in this period – documented cases of romantic love causing illness does well to suggest that there was little that could be done to stop such feelings in this period.

There is also evidence to suggest that romantic love was a stronger factor in marriage retention than financial value. As Stone points out, George Farquhar's successful stage work *The Beaux Stratagem* tells of the return of a wife's marriage portion, totalling ten thousand pounds, after the husband fails to fulfil her needs for romance and companionship – which 'is clearly regarded as no more than moral justice' by Early Modern audiences.[10] This would suggest that, while financial contributions in the form of marriage portions were important in brokering some marriage contracts, they were not the basis from which marriages were formed and maintained. The importance of romantic love is substantiated by Khandelwal, but she maintains that a lot of the time, romantic love was embraced in marriage for 'various reasons', depending on the case, but was regarded nonetheless as a necessity in the making of marriage.[11] This would suggest that romantic love was important in marriage to varying degrees and for various reasons, so it would be almost impossible to formulate a "one size fits all" description of the role of love in marriage – but it can be asserted with authority that romantic love was still ever-present as an important pillar of marriage at this time, regardless of its mitigating factors.

Despite the apparent power of romantic love in this period, matching couples for the purpose of marriage was not without its constraints – perhaps the greatest of which was social

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[8] Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage*, pp.219-220.

[9] Macfarlane, *Marriage and Love*, pp.205-206.

[10] Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage*, p.218.

[11] Meena Khandelwal, 'Arranging Love: Interrogating the Vantage Point in Cross-Border Feminism', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 34 (2009), 583–609 (p.587).

class, and the intertwined economic factors that came with it. This particularly affected the upper classes and nobility, as fewer suitable matches – as a result of social status and geographical location – led to marriage at a later age for most eligible bachelors in the higher social ranks.[12] Social class was also a factor in determining families' financial contribution to prospective marriages as well, with the higher-class families of brides tending to pay 'between £1000 and £5000,' in contrast to daughters of small-time farmers and husbandmen, who contributed 'between £10 and £15.'[13] From this evidence, it would be perfectly reasonable to suggest that because of social constraints, successful marriages in the upper classes were much harder to achieve, as the pressures to find a partner matching their social rank was greater than those in the classes below, compounded with the fact that there were simply fewer people in the elite ranks, greatly narrowing the pool of potential partners.

Nevertheless, that is not to say that the situation was not complicated for families from all social classes – in fact, families of all social classes encountered problems when it came to finding suitable matches as the 'conflicting ideals of patriarchy and idealism' came to a head in this period.[14] This would suggest that people were tending to break away from the socially prescribed ideals of marrying within their station, but – as O'Hara asserts – it seems that many couples set out to find the ideal balance between romantic attraction and parity of rank,[15] which implies that couples were not willing to break completely from traditional values when choosing a partner. With that being said, it seems that romantic love and traditional values were both considered in conjunction with one another when many young people in this period were finding a marriage partner, as more of a balanced consideration. Romantic love still seemed to be driving force in this period, with parity of

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[12] Ralph A. Houlbrooke, *The English Family, 1450-1700* (New York: Longman, 1984), p.65.

[13] Bailey, pp.85-86.

[14] Stone, *Uncertain Unions*, pp.12-13.

[15] Diana O'Hara, *Courtship and Constraint: Rethinking the Making of Marriage in Tudor England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p.6.

social becoming a mitigating factor, rather than a driving element in itself – as many still had the freedom to choose their partners, as long as they came from the appropriate pool of candidates.

Social constraints were not completely restricted to societal rank, however, and perception of the individual (especially the husband) in their ability to be an effective household head was also scrutinised in assessing their aptitude as part of a married couple.[16] Among these many competencies was personal financial worth, rather than that of the family they came from. One notable case of this is the engagement of Elizabeth Dodshon and Thomas Haswell, both of County Durham – their betrothal was terminated by the latter, when it transpired that the former had previously concealed debts that she was unable to pay.[17] This termination of engagement was upheld by an ecclesiastical court run by the Quakers, showing that this level of financial deceit was legally-recognised grounds for such a termination, and goes beyond just being regarded as social convention. This was also reflected in the marriage of Seaman Edward Barlow, who – despite proposing to his love interest – made an issue of her lack of wealth and possessions.[18] Although it did not become a deal-breaker in their marriage, Barlow felt that it was of enough note to raise in his diary, perhaps as a reference to prescribed social attitudes or, indeed, his own preference on a choice of partner.

This goes to show that there is more than one documented case in which individual financial worth has been a considered factor in the formation of a marriage, and this would suggest that although romantic love was a prominent factor in finding a marriage partner in this period, this factor was curtailed – but not entirely defeated – by the issues of individual and familial finances, as well as parity of social rank. There are, of course, many other desirable skills and traits that would have appealed to potential husbands or wives, but many

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[16] Alexandra Shepard, *Meanings of Manhood in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 70.
[17] Bailey, pp. 86-87.
[18] Houlbrooke, *English Family Life*, p. 34.

of these could not have been measured in the quantitative nature that personal finances could – to historians, this can prove problematic and may lead to inaccuracies or purely anecdotal evidence with little historical substance.

Of course, the constraints for young couples looking to marry were not strictly financial – the influence of family members and members of their communities likewise played a part in marriage formation in the Early Modern period. Although not considered a driving force in the making of marriage, family and community influence provided balancing factors to counteract the role of romantic love – the ideal match would be one which was able to satisfy all parties rather than sacrifice one criterion over another.[19] At this time, however, it seems as if things were not as clear cut – as Stone describes a drastic progression regarding attitudes on the issue throughout the Early Modern period. He states that at the start of this period, pressure and influence from family and the surrounding community was 'all but irresistible,' still the rise of individualism in most social circles allowed to more flexibility when it came to this process by the end of the Eighteenth Century.[20]

Conversely, there is evidence to suggest that earlier in the Early Modern period, families still did not have complete control over the marriages of their children – shown in the marriage of Sir John Oglander's youngest daughter in 1649. Despite his doubts about the match, he gives them their blessing and states '*Melius est obliuisci, quod non potest recuperari,*' which roughly translates to 'It is better to forget that which cannot be recovered.'[21] This shows that although, as the father of the bride-to-be, he has the ability to protest the match, instead he accepts that any potential protest would be unlikely to have any effect on his daughter's eventual decision to marry. The way in which romantic love remains unaffected by the father's disapproval of the match is not something that would happen in

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[19] O'Hara, p. 32.

[20] Stone, *Uncertain Unions*, p.8.

[21] 'The Marriage of Sir John Oglander's Youngest Daughter in 1649' Houlbrooke, *English Family Life*, p.18.

every such case, but the fact that there is evidence of it happening goes to show that family influence (especially of elders) was not always strong enough to overcome the driving force of romantic love in this period.

How a person was viewed within their own community would have an effect on their prospects of finding a suitable marriage partner, given the close-knit nature of towns and villages in the Early Modern period – reputation and how society viewed a person's moral conduct could be a constraining factor on marriage formation.[22] Therefore, although many teenagers and young adults were relatively free to form romantic relationships with the opposite sex, lack of financial independence meant staying celibate for a long while before being deemed by society to be ready to marry.[23]Although it was expected that both young men and women would eventually find a partner and settle down, Wrightson argues that marriage formation at this time was 'a privilege rather than a right,'[24] therefore potential marriages could be influenced or even prevented by members of the community, if they so desired.

Despite this, the family was considered 'fundamental' to the progression of society, so family formation under adequate moral standards were welcomed, and matches were not rejected by society without (supposed) good reason.[25] Society's influence was a constraining factor on the individual choice of young couples, but it can be suggested that its influence was seldom strong enough to fully stifle many controversial marriages, due to the presence of Clandestine Marriage in Early Modern England – which offered a way around things if constitutional marriage was prevented. Yet, constitutional marriage has been the main focus of this piece, and the influence of the community does not appear strong enough to prevent a

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[22] Charles Carlton, 'The Widow's Tale: Male Myths and Female Reality in 16th and 17th Century England', *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, 10 (1978), 118–29 (p. 121).
[23] Houlbrooke, *English Family Life*, p.15.
[24] Keith Wrightson, *English Society, 1580-1680* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p.70.
[25] Wrightson, *English Society,* p.66.

potential marriage, unless there was the legal authority to do so, in cases such as bigamy or incest. Community influence can definitely be seen as a factor in marriage formation, but perhaps not as one so strong as the influence of the family, or their social standing. Most community influence would occur in cases of accusations of immoral behaviour, which would in turn affect a person's prospect of finding a marriage partner.

From the evidence considered, it can be suggested that romantic love was the main driving force behind marriage in Early Modern England, but this romantic love and individualistic desire to choose partner did not come without its constraints. Social class, wealth and the community's attitude towards the engaged couple did play a part in marriage formation, though acted more as a counterbalance to romantic love, rather than being driving forces themselves. This level of individualistic freedom did vary between the social classes, but in a general sense, the freedom of choice enjoyed by Early Modern couples was relatively high, in comparison with earlier generations. The progression observed in this period also meant that marriage was becoming more and more geared towards romantic love and freedom of choice, which suggests that romantic love was not only the driving force for marriage formation, but also the driving force for progression and change to this social convention. While these are general observations, it is important to remember the variations displayed in this subject area, when it comes to the marriages of different couples. While some marriages were prevented by financial situation or social standing, some marriages carried on regardless of these factors, driven by romantic love and little else. This notion means that it is difficult to define driving forces of marriage, because of the unique nature of each marriage and its context – but in a more general sense, romantic love's role in marriage formation can be strongly agued to be a driving force.

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Livy *Ab Urbe Condita* Book 21

Born in 59BC, in the northern Italian city of Patavium in Cisalpine Gaul,[1] the historian Livy differed from his predecessors in more than just his representation of Roman history. Having only been incorporated into Italy in 49BC, thus gaining Roman citizenship, the local elite of the area − of which Livy was a member − were already highly Romanized. In contrast to Rome during the period, Patavium retained a relatively strict moral outlook, which is evidenced by the emphasis Livy places on morality throughout his work. Not only did Livy never sit in the Senate, or have any recorded public career to speak of, he also never had experience in the Roman military. Due to this lack of experience Livy's work lacks political acumen and military awareness.[2] This lack of a recorded public career, coupled with his lack of autobiographical detail, means that our knowledge of Livy as a man is limited.

Livy's major work *'From the founding of the city'* is potentially the most important single work in the Roman tradition of history. Livy wrote his history for numerous reasons including: sheer enjoyment in retracing Roman greatness of the past, the narration of Rome's steady moral decay from the foundation of the city and a sense of patriotism.[3] Livy's history could be seen as representing the moderately conservative political views and moral standards of the non-political classes of Italy, as he supported senatorial authority over the demagoguery of tribunes.[4] Livy's histories were deeply influenced by the concept of Roman Stoicism as a desirable trait, with an aim to nurture traditional Roman values by presenting examples of true Romans. Livy's work aimed to remember the past as it embodied the duty of *pietas* towards earlier Roman generations.[5] The underlying concept which most

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[1] Mellor (1999), 48.
[2] Mellor (1999), 50.
[3] Livy. 1.1; Mellor (1999), 49.
[4] Lintott (1989), 235; Mellor (1999), 48.
[5] Mellor (1999), 57.

characterised Livy's work was not reason or religion, but '*Virtus Romana',* the concept of a 'true Roman.'

The structure of Livy's history followed in the Roman tradition of annalistic history as opposed to a thematic style of recording,[6] treating events year by year, allowing him to incorporate change of theatre and location within single sections of his work. This was necessary in the compiling of a history; using available sources as there was no simple chronological indicator. This was due to Roman's identifying years by reference to consular names and the years they served their terms.[7] His history was divided into 142 books covering the period from the founding of Rome to the death of Drusus (753-9BC), though only 35 books survived to modern days including the first ten, and books 21-45. Book 21 is divided into 63 chapters.[8]

In Book 21, Livy describes the beginning of the Second Punic War (21.1), and how Hannibal, the general of the Carthaginians, crossed the river Ebro in violation of the treaty (21.20). Besieging Saguntum, a city belonging to allies of the Roman people, he captured it after an eight month period (21.14). These affronts against Rome, through the assault on one of her allies, led her to dispatch ambassadors to the Carthaginians to voice their complaints. Livy states that following Carthage's refusal of culpability for the violence against the town of Saguntum, war was declared against Carthage (21.18). Hannibal set off from Spain and after overcoming the passes of the Pyrenees (21.24), traversed Gaul. Livy describes Hannibal's routing of the Volcae against the banks of the Rhone (21.28) after they had attempted had to stop him crossing, and his arrival at the foot of the Alps. After a difficult passage through the Alps, during which he defeated the Gallic mountaineers in several battles when they blocked his way, he descended into Italy (21.38) and routed the Romans in a

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[6] Yardy (2006), 3.
[7] Walsh (1961), 5; Yardy (2006), 22.
[8] Yardy (2006), 1.

cavalry skirmish near the river Ticinus (21.46). In this battle Publius Cornelius Scipio was wounded and was saved by his son, who later received the name of Africanus. Again a Roman army, comprised of new recruits, was routed near the river Trebia following Hannibal's use of ambush tactics to conceal men (21.56). After this, Hannibal crossed the Apennines with great distress to his soldiers due to violent storms, with much suffering and many men lost (21.58). Rome sent Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio to Spain, who fought successfully against the Carthaginian armies and captured the enemy's general, Mago (21.60).

Livy's narrative can be considered a literary work, combined with that of a history in the way it expresses events, though at times it seems as if Livy sacrifices historical accuracy in favour of rhetoric embellishment.[9] Compared with the work of Polybius the difference in focus is obvious, as Polybius' focus upon institutions contrasts with Livy's concentration on the workings of the character which in turn determines success or failure.[10]

As history was a medium for moral instruction, Livy's history is conspicuous as it shows the view of the author. The moralistic style of Livy's history is imbued with a traditionally Pro-Republican outlook, with an emphasis on adherence to a strict moral code. This moral dimension of his work can be seen being emphasised by Livy's penchant for over exaggerating virtue or vice through dramatic writing.[11]

With the opening of Book 21, Livy sets the scene for the 2nd Punic War whilst bringing characters as individuals to centre stage (21.1). The focus of the book is on Hannibal Barca. Livy keeps the focus of the book on him via methods such as protagonists' speeches and direct speech, to refer to him and to demonstrate his virtues and nature through his

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[9] Walsh (1961), 208.
[10] Luce (1977), 230.
[11] Mellor (1999), 57.

actions and responses.[12] Despite this, the reader is often left to make up their own mind about Hannibal through his endeavours and the battles he engages in. Livy's early characterisation of Hannibal, and its favourable nature despite his status as an enemy of Rome, suggests his importance in the coming narrative. Livy describes Hannibal as a man of great tactical skill, dash and confidence with the power to command (21.4). The image of Hannibal that Livy creates to fit his narrative is a charismatic brave leader, who is quick on his feet, but lacking in moral weight and wisdom.[13] Livy also enumerates Hannibal's vices including his reported cruelty, dishonesty, impiety and lack of general honour. These traits indemnify Hannibal as a distinctly un-Roman commander, whilst Livy acknowledges his tactical skills, who is able to provide Rome with a worthy adversary for the moral and stoic Roman characters. Hannibal is shown as less than Roman generals, if not tactically then morally.

Livy's portrayal of Roman characters, though not flawless, provides a contrast to the Carthaginians. Livy individualises Romans as positive moral figures in line with his description of the Roman people as a whole throughout Book 21. The Roman people are shown as moral, though not faultless, with Livy providing contrasts between the actions of the two sides during the war, focusing on Scipio and Hannibal's treatment of captured settlements as juxtapositions. Scipio's restrained treatment of Antanagrum upon its surrender, directly (21.61) contrasts with the Carthaginian sack of Victumlae (21.57), where Hannibal allows his men to inflict atrocities, emphasised by Livy's use of dramatic rhetoric to maintain the interest of the reader . The contrast is obvious between the morality of Rome and Carthage's lack of such virtue. Publius Scipio is used by Livy as a mouthpiece and an idealistic Roman, highlighted by his appeal to a Roman sense of solidarity between soldiers

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[12] Foulkes (1999), 1.
[13] Foulkes (1999), 2.

(21.40). This shows Livy depicting him in tune with the Roman values that Livy considers important, and an imperative ingredient in Roman historical military success.[14]

Though Livy took considerable pains with the artistic arrangement of his narrative, he paid even more attention to the composition of his speeches due to their importance in the telling of his history. The insertion of composed speeches was an ingrained factor in Roman history writing.[15] Characterisation of participants through multiple literary methods remains the ultimate purpose of Livy's narrative. Unlike the speeches of Polybius' history, Livy composes his speeches not according to what was said, but with words which would have been appropriate for the occasion.[16] This is evidenced by the differing speeches that Polybius and Livy grant Hannibal when he addresses his men prior to the battle of Trebia (21.43).[17] Livy's speeches provide an insight into his opinion of the character, conveying any criticisms or partiality. The use of speeches to portray Roman morality and its defining importance is particularly evident in Livy's comparisons of the characters of Hannibal and Scipio (21.40-44). Scipio's arguments to his men stress not only the simple and possible, but also the religious, the pious and the right, as would be expected of an idealised stoical Roman. Hannibal's emphases are placed more upon materialistic motives, profit and the possible.

Livy's complete lack of experience meant that he would not have visited the places he wrote about, nor was he a contemporary of the 2nd Punic War period and so, he could not interview eye-witnesses on the subjects. Due to these to prevailing factors Livy's is heavily dependent on his sources including public records from the time and other histories. Livy's reliance upon sources more contemporary to the period led to many failings with his narrative, whilst drawing its reliability as a source of history into question.

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[14] Foulkes (1999), 4.
[15] Walsh (1961), 223.
[16] Walsh (1961), 38.
[17] Polybius. 3.63.3.

Livy relies heavily on the accounts of the Greek historian Polybius and of the Roman annalist Coelius, though it would appear due to Livy's form of referencing that Coelius is relied on more for Book 21 (21.38). Dorey is of the opinion that these two sources used the same primary sources when writing their accounts, which he suggests is why the accounts of Livy and Polybius are similar, despite Livy's reliance on Coelius as a source.[18] Livy's reluctance to synthesise sources means that he uses one religiously as his guide for a specific period, before changing abruptly to a different source. This practice leads to issues with the works cohesion and makes it confusing as Livy repeats events and contradicts himself. In Hannibal's Spanish operation Livy appears to repeat events (21.5), and when Livy discusses Hannibal's crossing of the Apennines he makes mention to the operation twice, claiming that the first was merely an attempt in 218BC.[19] As Livy declares that Hannibal crossed the mountains in the spring of 217BC it would appear that Livy possessed two accounts with conflicting dates which he coalesced.

This use of multiple sources occasionally causes continuity issues within Livy's histories; when he possesses contradicting sources he often gives both, using no apparent methodology to evaluate their merit. Mellor agrees with this perception of Livy, stating that he does not work hard enough to root out the falsifications of the annalistic historians.[20] In Book 21 when discussing the numbers of men in Hannibal's army after the crossing of the Alps, Livy states his distrust for the numbers provided to him by the records of annalists. Despite this he includes them anyway, in spite of the fact that Polybius' account is the most accurate as it was taken from a column Hannibal had inscribed himself.[21]

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[18] Dorey & Dudley (1971), 27.
[19] Dorey & Dudley (1971), 36.
[20] Mellor (1999), 68.
[21] Livy. 21.38; Polybius. 3.56.4.

Another failing of Livy is his inability to account for the biases of sources he relies heavily upon. Walsh states that Livy struggles to gain objectivity due to his uncritical patriotism, with his use of distinctly pro-Roman sources such as Fabius Pictor.[22] However, Walsh is not entirely correct. Livy does not make Romans out to be flawless characters in his narrative; showing anger clouding the judgement of Lucius Manlius upon learning of the capture of Roman envoys by the Gaul's.[23] Despite wishing to portray the characters of Rome's past as true Romans, he is not so blinded by this mission as to conceive the Roman people as perfect.

Detrimental to the reliability of Livy's work is his chronological presentation of events, which is often confused or out of sync. This is due to the differing ways in which the chronology of Livy's sources were recorded, with Roman sources based on consular years and Greek sources not, causing him difficulties in reconciling them.[24] This is evident at Saguntum where Livy places the capture of the city in 218BC instead of 219BC, more than likely due to following a wrong source.[25] Another failing of Livy in Book 21 is that he shows dubious inaccuracies in geographical details, with the route Livy suggests for Hannibal's crossing of the Alps still impossible to trace even in modern days.[26] Livy's initial narration generally consistent with that of Polybius, though it suddenly diverges with Hannibal travelling further north than stated in the account of Polybius,[27]meaning that in Livy's account Hannibal's force emerged into the lands of the Taurini and in Polybius' account they came to the lands of the Insubres. The most likely explanation is that Livy is again adhering to Nissen's law and switching sources mid narrative, unwittingly describing a different part of Hannibal's journey. Proctor's presumption is that Livy put his narrative together from

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[22] Walsh (1961), 36.
[23] Livy. 21.25.
[24] Dorey & Dudley (1971), 36.
[25] Livy. 21.15.
[26] Dorey & Dudley (1971), 37.
[27] Livy. 21.31; Polybius. 3.49.5.

multiple accounts, suggesting why his portrayal is irreconcilable with the Polybian description of Hannibal's march.[28]

Livy is limited by his lack of detailed understanding of the Roman political system, never able to fully analyse the workings of public opinion or politics. These shortcomings in Livy's passage is evidenced by the stereotyped appearance of the 'senate' who are mentioned as deciding or enacting policies though we are granted no further insight into Roman political machinations within the passage.[29] His work is heavily reliant upon his sources as his inexperience means that he cannot make a judgement on political actions and as such, is dependent upon the experiences of those whose sources he uses. The same issues are prevalent in Livy's depiction of battle scenes and the tactical flow of the conflict. Livy simplifies battles for the main reason that he simply does not have enough experience or knowledge of war to provide an accurate representation. Livy's battle account at Trebia (21.56) is representative of battle as a concept in Livy's histories, formulaic and basic in approach. When compared with the account of Polybius,[30] Livy's inexperience becomes obvious. The level of detail provided by Polybius is far greater in comparison than what we are told by Livy, for example Polybius describes the breaking of the Roman flanks which is completely disregarded by the account of Livy. Polybius, being a man experienced in war, is able to provide insights into the tactics employed that Livy purely does not understand.

Livy's account of the outbreak of the 2nd Punic War is a comprehensive compendium of historical knowledge on the period though detracted from due to its reliance upon other accounts. Livy writes in a useful style and his rhetoric makes the reading of the book enjoyable, though his dramatic writing style is better suited to the speeches he gives his leading characters than to descriptions of the battlefield. The confusion shown by Livy in the

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[28] Proctor (1971), 180; Polybius. 3. 46-56.
[29] Livy. 21.40.
[30] Polybius. 3.72.7.

handling of sources, in both his expression of chronology and his understanding of topography, limits the sources usefulness. These factors, combined with Livy's inexperience in political and military aspects of history means that his work, while a useful piece, is essentially flawed.

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Why did Ramesses III try to emulate Ramesses II?

In any profession, emulating the success of predecessors allows the hope of similar success, particularly in times of a strengthened need for a return to such stability. When Ramesses III ascended the throne close to the beginning of the twentieth dynasty, he took steps to attempt to emulate the reign of Ramesses II that had occurred several decades previous to his own. Why would Ramesses III have a need to emulate a previous pharaoh? Times had changed since the end of the reign of Ramesses the Great, and by associating himself with a pharaoh whose reign was still so closely associated with success, prosperity and peace, Ramesses III ascribed to his own reign the hope of returning Egypt to the state that it was in during the height of the New Kingdom. Because of the factors which caused the decline in peace and prosperity in Egypt, Ramesses III did not have the opportunity to assert his success in the same way that his famous predecessor did, and so the most hopeful way that he could be remembered as favourably in Egyptian history would have been to emulate the pharaoh who served as such a strong model for the ideal pharaoh. To an extent, emulating such a great predecessor worked for Ramesses III. By many, he is considered the last great pharaoh of the New Kingdom before its downfall which followed his reign (Kitchen 1983, 224), and his success could be drawn from a desire to emulate the success of Ramesses II.

The name and reputation of Ramesses II continued in history long after his death, and his achievements set a standard to which later pharaohs would be compared (Freed 1987, 24). During his reign, Egypt reached a peak in terms of empire, peace and wealth. The length of his reign allowed sufficient opportunity for self-promotion, and long before his death his name was well-known and respected in the sense that he had been elevated to the status of living legend, so the reputation and influence that he would continue to have after his death would have been in no doubt for his successors (Tyldesley 2000, 1–2). The legacy of Ramesses II was great enough to last long after his death and serve as an example for later

pharaohs to model themselves upon, but for a pharaoh ascending the throne as close to the reign of the great pharaoh as Ramesses III, the achievements of Ramesses II were even more significant when considered in comparison to the three decades following his death. Despite the huge success of Ramesses II's reign, the reigns of his successors saw a decline in the prosperity and greatness that had characterised his reign.

The end of the nineteenth dynasty saw a decline in the stability and authority of the ruling house of Egypt (Kitchen 1983, 215–7). Associating himself with Ramesses II implied that Ramesses III's reign would be a continuation of a point in Egypt's history that was successful, rather than a continuation of the period to which his own reign actually belonged. He provided himself with distance from the chaos that had seen the decline and fall of the nineteenth dynasty. The motivation to emulate the reign of Ramesses II and associate himself with the pharaoh here serves as a means to distance himself from this chaotic sequence of rulers who had represented, particularly when following a hugely successful and long reign, great political instability (Dodson 2010, 31–46). It is hardly surprising that, following decades of political strife, short reigns and the usurpation of monuments and reliefs, Ramesses III chose to try emulating Ramesses II, who was at that point the most recent pharaoh to have presided over a peaceful Egypt with a stable government. The time between the death of Ramesses II and the beginning of Setnakht's reign which established the twentieth dynasty was described in the Great Harris Papyrus as a time in which the people had no leader for many years, during which time Egypt was in a state of lawlessness and chaos. This was apparently followed by many 'empty years' of no rulers, followed by the seizing of power by the Syrian Irsu, until the gods chose Setnakht, Ramesses III's predecessor, to rule and re-establish order (van Dijk 2003, 296). Although propagandistic for the sake of legitimising Setnakht's reign, this could still be considered a source, in moderation, for the people's perception of the state that Egypt was in following a hugely

successful reign. If the reigns of his predecessors from the end of the nineteenth dynasty were actually so damaged that they were hardly considered to have been rulers at all, then this serves as an even stronger incentive for the attempted revival of Ramesses II's success. The peace and order that was established by Setnakht upon the establishment of the twentieth dynasty was seemingly inherited by Ramesses III upon his accession, but his troubles with the Libyans and Sea Peoples overshadowed much of the first decade of his reign (van Dijk 2003, 297). This trouble with the Sea Peoples had occurred since the reign of Merenptah – consequently filling the time between Ramesses III's own reign and that of Ramesses II – and their destruction was evident throughout the Middle East.

Many of the problems that Ramesses III faced during his reign had arisen following the death of Ramesses II, and the subsequent decline of the nineteenth dynasty. Merenptah, Ramesses II's son and successor, encountered problems with the Libyans and Sea People during his short reign. Although he was victorious over them, the threat of these groups seems to have continued until the accession of Ramesses III three decades later. Usurpation and strife were key to the breakdown of the nineteenth dynasty and the decline from the peak, which had been reached in the reign of Ramesses II (Dodson & Hilton 2004, 176). Because each king between himself and Ramesses II had represented part of a chain of short reigns and often some level of disorder, restoring *ma'at* and returning Egypt to a state of peace and prosperity would make Ramesses III a successful king at the beginning of a new and hopefully successful dynasty. By trying to emulate the respected Ramesses II, Ramesses III was using a model which had proved immensely successful only a few decades previously and gave hope that Egypt could return to a similar state of peace and stability.

The most immediate efforts that Ramesses III made to emulate his predecessor and try to follow suit of Ramesses II's reign was the use of his name, which would have been a significant factor in attempting to align the two pharaohs in the minds of contemporary

Egyptians. The desire to emulate the reign of Ramesses II did not come from an attempt to continue the family line of dynastic ideals, however, as Ramesses III was no more than perhaps a distant relative of Ramesses II, and he ascended the throne in a new dynasty. Regardless, by using Ramesses' name there was a clear and immediate link to be made between the pharaohs. At the mention of his name, the people would be reminded of the previous prosperity of Egypt not much longer than only a generation previously, and the new pharaoh would be associated with the hopeful revival of this, distanced from the failures of the pharaohs who reigned between them. Similarly, his name as recorded on monuments would bear similarity to the previous king, so that in posterity he may be remembered alongside him in a similar respect. Ramesses III's royal titulary demonstrates his desire to emulate previous pharaohs and associate himself with their success, not only with Ramesses II but also with dynastic founders. His Horus name was a copy of those of the dynastic founders Ahmose (eighteenth dynasty) and Ramesses I (nineteenth dynasty), emphasising that he recognised the importance of being associated with the achievements of previous pharaohs and did not aim to emulate only one. This connection to the founders of previous dynasties introduces the idea that Ramesses III considered himself the true founder of the twentieth dynasty. However, more important to the image that Ramesses III was creating for himself was the connection of himself to Ramesses the Great. The other components to his name were based on those of Ramesses II, boldly making an immediate connection between himself and the previous pharaoh to make it clear that his own reign would attempt to be similar to that of Ramesses II (Kitchen 1983, 137; Kitchen 2012, 3–4).

By the end of Ramesses II's reign, there had been an increase in the importance of the king's family rather than the sole importance of him alone. This concept of the broad 'royal family' that Ramesses II had adopted and promoted during his reign was a relatively new one, different to those of previous dynasties up until the Amarna Period (Dodson 2010, 6–7).

This continued throughout the period as a new aspect of the Ramesside age, having been used by Ramesses III, perhaps to emulate the success of Ramesses II's family rather than as a king alone, hoping to bring the same success to his own family. Ramesses III, as well as taking on the names of his respected predecessor himself, also named nine of his eleven known children directly after some of Ramesses II's own children, perhaps in an effort to bring the same fortunate attributes and achievements to his family as were evident in the family of Ramesses II. In emulating this importance of family, Ramesses III aligned himself firmly with the continuation of Ramesses II's reign and dynasty. This served as an almost effortless way to emulate the success of the previous Ramesses and his family, and hope to achieve the same success through his own family, particularly following the period of short reigns previous to his own which emphasised the breakdown of a family dynasty. Ramesses III's sons often received the same offices as their namesakes, meaning that they were successful in their father's administration just as the children of Ramesses II had been (Dodson & Hilton 2004, 160–1, 186–7). The scenes depicting the royal family of Ramesses III at Medinet Habu were copied directly from those of Ramesses II's family at the Ramesseum, implying a desire to be equal to, rather than simply associated with, this successful family from the previous dynasty (Kitchen 1982, 119 n. 22). Although perhaps a simple means of emulation, the use of the same names for himself and for his family aligned Ramesses III's image with that of a successful pharaoh, as well as projecting the view of his reign and his family being as successful and prosperous in Egypt as his predecessors had been.

Ramesses III, along with his government and his people, would have been very aware of the conflict affecting Egypt following the reign of Ramesses II. Perhaps trying to emulate the success that Ramesses II had exercised over the foreign enemies created hope of having his own victories over them, just as Ramesses had done and had documented so profusely for further generations to be reminded of.

A notable achievement of Ramesses II's reign was the building of fortresses along the west of Egypt to protect the country from a Libyan invasion, made possible as a result of peace negotiations with the Hittite empire. With the northern front peaceful, Ramesses II had the opportunity to focus on securing Egypt's western border from threats in Libya (van Dijk, 2003, 290). Control over the Libyans, at least for a long enough period of time to allow the construction of these fortresses, must be assumed, suggesting the level of control that Ramesses II had over them, and the extent to which he was able to prevent this foreign threat to *ma'at* in Egypt from the west. However, following his death, the Libyan threat arose again and his immediate successor Merenptah led a campaign against the Libyans in his fifth regnal year (van Dijk 2003, 294; Cline 2014, 6). The coalition of the forces of the Libyans and the Sea People was defeated, but the Libyans posed a threat to Egypt throughout its history, and were a significant part of Ramesses III's foreign activity (Cline 2014, 9, 136). Campaigns were led against the Libyans in both the fifth and eleventh regnal years of Ramesses III, which now eclipse much of his reign and must have been a significant part of his reign in the forefront of the minds of his people and in his legacy.

In Ramesses II's fifth regnal year, he had set out to recapture Qadesh, which had again fallen under Hittite control. The Battle of Qadesh has not been regarded by Egyptologists as a definite victory for either side due to the nature of recordings from both the Egyptians and the Hittites, each recording victory in the battle (Kitchen 1983, 53–60; van de Mieroop 2012, 40). Regardless of the true outcome of the battle, the 'victory' over the Hittites was recorded with credit to Ramesses II at Karnak. This served to create an image of Ramesses II as the ultimate leader in terms of both war and order – his strength in battle allowed for the Egyptians' victory and enforced the idea of Ramesses as a capable leader who could restore *ma'at* to Egypt in the event of foreign threat. Further foreign campaigns followed in the next 15 years of Ramesses' reign to further secure Egypt's empire, and the

peace treaty formed with the Hittites in his 21ˢᵗ regnal year demonstrated the effectiveness of Ramesses' reign and the peace that his actions could bring to Egypt (van de Mieroop 2010, 40–1, 107, 110–1). This notion of peace with former enemies is upheld in records, as many decades later it is recorded at Karnak that Ramesses II's son and successor Merenptah sent grain to the Hittites during a famine. Following this, the peace and prosperity of Egypt continued, and Ramesses II worked to establish himself as a god. Peace continued and Egypt and its people prospered in its continuation, and the fourteen jubilees of the pharaoh reinforced the idea that he was ruling as a god with the promise of an eternal rule with support from the gods and the growth of his country (Freed 1987, 48–9).

Whereas Ramesses III's own reign was dominated by Libyans and the Sea Peoples, that of Ramesses II, which acted as a model reign to follow, was concerned primarily with Syria in the first decade of his rule (Dodson 2010, 10). One way in which Ramesses III therefore could not turn to the victories of Ramesses II before him as a model for his own military efforts was in the case of the events that led to the Late Bronze Age collapse, which affected not only Egypt but also each of the great powers of that period (Cline 2014, 2). The military victories that were achieved in the midst of international chaos were more vital to Ramesses III's reign than they had been to Ramesses II (Kitchen 1983, 218). The Sea Peoples had attacked Egypt in Ramesses III's eighth regnal year, and brought down each of the powerful countries in the area – the Mycenaeans, the Canaanites, the Cypriots and others – who, according to Ramesses' inscriptions at Medinet Habu, could not resist the threat of these foreign enemies (Wilson 1969, 262–3). The forces of the Peleset, Tjekker, Shekelesh, Danuna and Weshesh recorded at Medinet Habu along with the Shardana (Adams & Cohen 2013, 645–64), are known from Egyptian recordings. Both the land and sea battles against the Sea Peoples are prominent events within the reign of Ramesses III, each recorded at Medinet Habu to remember the pharaoh's victory. The victory over these people, who were such a

threat to such a large part of known civilisation at that time, could be considered a victory for Ramesses III on the same scale as the achievement of Ramesses II concerning Qadesh or the building of fortresses to secure the western border. Although Ramesses II's son and immediate successor Merenptah had dealt with the Sea Peoples, Ramesses II himself did not display victorious accounts over them which Ramesses III could have hoped to emulate in an effort to each his situation. Despite the fact that so many factors of Ramesses III's reign can be considered as attempts to emulate Ramesses II, he records his own victory over the Sea Peoples, after which they would not return to Egypt as 'their heart and soul are finished forever and ever', and 'their ships and their goods were as if fallen into the water' (Wilson 1969, 262–3). Although Egypt under Ramesses III was the only power to successfully resist the Sea People, they had a lasting effect on the rest of the Mediterranean and subsequently on Egypt itself.

Although Ramesses II was militarily active in Nubia and Libya to secure Egypt's dominant position as well as being concerned with affairs in Syria, much of his reign was peaceful and was focused on building activity, which allowed him to boast of his achievements. This left Ramesses II's mark firmly across the whole of Egypt and left no doubt of how much he was able to achieve during his time as pharaoh. Because of this vast recording of the military successes of Ramesses II, which led to the beginning of a peaceful reign, attempting to emulate the international control that his predecessor possessed through these victories could have been another way that Ramesses III aimed to emulate Ramesses II. Fortunately, for the sake of aligning himself with the great victorious pharaoh, the circumstances arose for Ramesses III to have the chance to emulate Ramesses II through military victories (Snape 2012, 405). The extent to which each pharaoh's main military achievements were boasted of and used to emphasise the success of his reign is most clear through their building activity and the decoration of their monuments, which Ramesses II

certainly set a precedent for. This is perhaps a more clear indication of the ways in which Ramesses III tried to emulate Ramesses II, rather than through comparison of military achievements that were, for the majority, against different enemies and had varied levels of significance in the context of each pharaoh's reign.

A reminder of the success of Ramesses II's reign, his power and authority, and the image of him as a fully divine being, was seen in the results of his extensive building work, most significantly his newly-established capital Per-Ramesses, his memorial temple in Nubia, Abu Simbel, and his mortuary temple, the Ramesseum. Each acted as a lasting reminder to following generations of his achievements and the long, peaceful reign which allowed him to successfully embark on such building activity; these would have served an essential point of continuation and emulation for Ramesses III. Large monuments across Egypt also served as a reminder of the great pharaoh to remain in people's minds, and during Ramesses III's reign these would have acted as a reminder to the people of the reign that the new pharaoh was attempting to emulate Ramesses II, and therefore the state which the country would, at least hopefully, be returned to. Despite his building efforts suggesting that Ramesses III's reign was not as prosperous as his famous predecessor, by building ambitiously and extensively to spread his ideology and display the image of himself as a deified being early in his reign, he deliberately emulated Ramesses II's building programme (Mojsov 2012, 271).

Ramesses II, with such an important legacy and such an impressive building program to keep implementing its influence, would have naturally been a role model for the ideal pharaoh. His legacy particularly would have displayed what a successful pharaoh could achieve during his reign, which had not been shown on such a grand scale before thanks to the length of his reign. Ramesses III's own mortuary temple, Medinet Habu, was closely modelled on the Ramesseum (Kitchen 1983, 218). Although the Ramesseum is now in much ruin and it is difficult to know exactly how closely it was copied (O'Connor 2012, 212–3),

the structures are similar and Medinet Habu reflects the battles against the Libyans and the Sea Peoples (Murnane 1980, 13–18) just as the Ramesseum portrays Ramesses II's success at Qadesh (Kitchen 1983, 55 fig.18). Even the pattern of reliefs at Medinet Habu was copied from the Ramesseum, by displaying reliefs depicting activity in the Levant inside and out of the first court just as Ramesses II had displayed his Levant and Qadesh military scenes inside and out of the first court of the Ramesseum (Kitchen 2012, 15). Reliefs and inscriptions were copied to such exact detail that blocks were mistakenly inserted into the wrong temple in modern restorations (Teeter 2012, 44). Ramesses III's efforts to expand Per-Ramesses also served as a physical continuation of Ramesses II's achievements. That is not to say that Ramesses III copied Ramesses II's building activity in every sense, it has been suggested that Medinet Habu improved upon the plan of the Ramesseum rather than simply copying it to create the same temple (O'Connor 2012, 224–5, 237). By emulating Ramesses II's building work to some extent, Ramesses III could hope to leave the same mark on Egypt as part of his legacy, and could boast of his achievements just as his predecessor had done.

Ramesses III sat on Egypt's throne as pharaoh for three decades, and although considerably longer than the reigns of his predecessors at the end of the nineteenth dynasty, he did not have the opportunity to assert his own importance with such ease as Ramesses II had done in his own reign. Because of the progressing collapse of the Bronze Age in the Mediterranean, completing his own victories against foreign threats, decreasing economic stability and the continuation of internal political strife, Ramesses III lacked the time of peace and prosperity which had allowed Ramesses III to assert his importance throughout Egypt. The military efforts, which were so significant to the success in Ramesses III's reign, contributed to an economic strain on Egypt. Economic difficulty in upholding the empire in Asia proved difficult at this time, as the government lost control of the balance of finance and payments to the temples (van Dijk 2003, 298). Consequently, this led to a decline of Egypt's

empire and of governmental control, which although not recorded so as to not acknowledge the failures of Ramesses' and the declining strength of Egypt at this time, eventually led to loss of control of state finance and the inability to pay the workmen at Deir el-Medina (Lesko 1994, 38–9). Repeated raids by groups of Libyans in the Theban area and workmen strikes in Deir el-Medina, although not drastic enough to cause a decline as chaotic as the kings previously, caused a feeling of unrest and insecurity in Egypt. These factors contributed further to the breakdown of the centralised state, which had started with the death of Ramesses II and gradually progressed (van Dijk 2003, 298). These factors would have made it difficult, in fact nearly impossible, to create a powerful lasting image for himself during his reign. However, the monuments of Ramesses III overlook these factors and, emulating those of Ramesses II, display a reign of continuity and stability.

Despite changes in Egypt and the fact that it was defensive by the time of Ramesses III, he tried to emulate the achievements of Ramesses II in both war and peace, the achievements which had made him such a successful pharaoh (Kitchen 1983, 217). The motivation for doing so cannot have been clearer: Ramesses III wanted success on the same scale as Ramesses II. Whether this was in terms of his family, his building activity, or his monuments and legacy, Ramesses II was the most recent successful pharaoh before Ramesses III's own reign. The vast length of his reign provided many examples to his successors to copy in an attempt to emulate his reign. Although Ramesses III did not end up ruling as successfully and for as long as the pharaoh whose successes he modelled his own on, without his actions the steady national decline of Egypt may perhaps have begun on a significant scale decades earlier, incorporating the years of Ramesses' reign rather than beginning after them. It is clear that Ramesses would wish to be regarded as a king from the same mould as his illustrious namesake, (Snape 2012, 404) despite the factors that affected his ability to rule over an Egypt as peaceful and successful as Ramesses II had been able to do.

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